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In some countries, the minimum wage is more e⁄ective among those who are
regarded as informal workers than in other segments of the labor markets.1
Minimum wages and the evaluation of their impact on the labor market have been
central in the empirical literature for many years (Card and Krueger 1995). Recently,
the focus has shifted towards the minimum wage in developing countries and their het-
erogeneous labor markets. Here, the hypothesis has been put forward that labor market
regulations, the minimum wage being one of them, directed at the formal labor market
a⁄ect the informal labor market (Harrison and Leamer 1997). This was also highlighted
by the above quote, which proposes an even stronger hypothesis: labor market regula-
tions directed at the formal labor market a⁄ect the informal labor market more than the
formal labor market. Empirical evidence on this is very sparse in the literature and a
need for further research in the area of labor market policies and regulations for several
Latin American countries, including Argentina, was emphasized in the literature (IADB
2004; Heckman and Pages 2003).
Using two quasi-experiments in the application of econometric techniques from the
developed country minimum wages literature, this paper investigates the impact of min-
imum wage increases on the formal and informal labor market of a developing country.
Moreover, it is of interest to see whether the impact provides evidence for the hypothesis
that the minimum wage is more applicable in the informal segment of the labor market
than the formal segment. This paper ￿nds support for this hypothesis when looking
at two minimum wage changes, 1993 and 2004, in Argentina, a country with a large
degree of labor informality. A signi￿cant wage increase was found for the overall and
the informal wage distribution after minimum wage changes while this was not the case
for the formal wage distribution.
In the next section some of the most related literature and previous ￿ndings are
presented. Thereafter background on minimum wages and informality in Argentina and
available data are discussed. In the fourth section I describe my empirical strategy
and obtained results, with tests for the applicability of the empirical strategy and a
1Quote from Enrique V. Iglesias, Former President of Inter-American Development Bank, IADB
(2004)
2robustness check. In the conclusion the contribution and implications of these results
for policy are considered.
2 Minimum wages and the informal sector
Minimum wage policies are not only a common labor market feature in developed coun-
tries, but also in many developing countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East
and Asia (Mazumdar, 1989). This section brie￿ y reviews some theoretical considerations
of the impact of minimum wage policies on the formal and informal labor market in de-
veloping countries. In addition to that the most relevant existing empirical evidence for
developing countries is presented.
2.1 Theory
Theoretical considerations on the impact of the minimum wage depends on the view of
the labor market and its dynamics in developing countries, where the informal labor mar-
ket coexist alongside the formal segment of the labor market. Government interventions
potentially have di⁄erential impacts on the formal and informal labor market.
In the traditional dualistic labor markets the view prevails that these two labor
markets, formal and informal, are segmented by nominal wage rigidities such as the
minimum wage (Harris and Todaro 1970; Mazumdar 1989). Following the two-sector
model of the labor market of Mazumdar (1989), one can observe competitive market
wages and full employment before the introduction of the minimum wage in covered
(formal) and uncovered (informal) sector. After the introduction of the minimum wage,
which increases the formal sector wage, some workers become unemployed in the formal
labor market. Some of these workers might decide to remain unemployed and wait for a
job in the formal sector. Other displaced workers might seek employment in the informal
sector. This would increase the labor supply in the informal labor market and thereby
driving down the informal sector wage. The informal labor market would clear at a wage
level below the competitive wage.
The minimum wage impact here would result in an increase in formal wages and
a decrease in informal wages. In terms of employment the e⁄ects are the opposite:
a decrease in employment in the formal sector and an increase in employment in the
3informal sector (Harrison and Leamer 1997). The magnitudes of these e⁄ect crucially
depend on minimum wage e⁄ectiveness on wages and on the labor demand elasticity
(Mazumdar 1989).
This, tough, are not the only potential impacts of the minimum wage on wages
and employment in the formal and informal sector. Three possible channels how the
minimum wage might potentially increase informal wages are identi￿ed in the literature
(Bird and Manning 2002):
(1) Minimum wages due their redistributive nature can increase income not only in
the formal sector but also in the informal sector (Saget 2001; Lustig and Mcleod 1996;
Carruth and Oswald 1981). For instance, in this framework the formal sector wage
increase due to the minimum wage could lead to capital reallocation into the labor-
intensive informal sector, which in turn would raise informal sector wages (Harrison and
Leamer 1997).
(2) The minimum wage has a positive impact on informal wages through linkages of
the labor and goods market (Fizsbein 1992). The assumption of a high employment share
of the informal sector and formal sector workers as main buyers of the informal sector
products is crucial for this result and highly dependent on the particular elasticities of the
demand and supply e⁄ect of the minimum wage (Bird and Manning 2002). An increase
in formal sector wages would increase the demand for goods and services produced in
the informal sector, which leads to an increase in informal sector wages. Also this model
assumes a relatively homogeneous informal labor market, which has been contested in
the literature (Fields 1990).
(3) The minimum wage is used as a ￿ benchmark￿for what is considered fair remuner-
ation in the labor market. The minimum wage is employed as numeraire and thereby
wages and bene￿ts are quoted in multiples of the minimum wage (Maloney and Nunez
2003).
These three channels are put forward by the literature as potential explanations for
the so-called lighthouse e⁄ect of the minimum wage on the informal wage distribution,
which is tested in recent empirical literature for developing countries.
42.2 Empirical evidence in developing countries
The empirical literature on the minimum wage impact for developing countries is still
relatively small, but growing, and lacks empirical evidence for many developing countries
(Lemos 2004). For Brazil and Indonesia the empirical literature on the minimum wage
impacts is more exhaustive than for other developing countries, which is shortly reviewed
here. Thereafter a summary of the previous sparse empirical research on Argentina is
also described.
In the Brazilian studies of the minimum wage authors generally ￿nd that the min-
imum wage compressed the wage distribution for formal and informal labor market
(Carneiro 2000; Corseuil and Carneiro 2000; Corseuil and Morgado 2000; Fainzylber
2001; Lemos 2004ab; Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo 2001; Maloney and Nunez 2003;
Amado, Gill and Neri 2002).2 On the employment e⁄ects some mixed results are ob-
tained tough. On one hand studies suggested a small negative employment e⁄ect in
both sectors (Fajnzylber 2001; Lemos 2004b); on the other hand other studies suggest
a negative employment e⁄ect in the formal labor market and a positive e⁄ect on the
informal labor market (Carneiro 2000).
For Indonesia the minimum wage impact on the formal and informal labor market
indicates that the average wage for di⁄erent subgroups of the labor market increases
after minimum wage changes (SMERU 2001; Rama 2001). However, at the same time
for a segment of the informal sector a negative wage impact is found (Bird and Manning
2002). In terms of employment impact a negative employment e⁄ect is found among
small, domestic ￿rms or young and female workers (SMERU 2001; Alatas and Cameron
2003; Rama 2001). This is contradicted by ￿ndings of informal employment increases
(Bird and Manning 2002).
Empirical evidence of the impact of the minimum wage on the informal sector has
been found in several Latin American countries (Grindling and Terrell 2004; Montenegro
and Pages 2003; Castillo-Freeman and Freeman 1991; Bell 1997; Maloney and Nunez
2003). Several previous studies on the Argentine minimum wage have found evidence of
the impact of the minimum wage on wages and employment in the informal sector (Fizs-
bein 1992; FIEL 2000; Szretter 2004; Kostzer 2006; SEL Consultores 2006; Kristensen
2A comprehensive overview of the literature on the e⁄ects of the minimum wage in Brazil can be
found in Carneiro (2001) and Lemos (2004b).
5and Cunningham 2006).
In his study Beccaria (2004), who uses probit analysis to estimate the probability
of an individual remaining in the same labor market status after the minimum wage
change as before the minimum wage change, investigates the minimum wage impact on
salaried and non-registered workers. Following a panel for Greater Buenos Aires for the
period May to October 1993, he ￿nds that the minimum wage has no signi￿cant impact
on employment. In his analysis he leaves out potential wage impacts and does not take
advantage of the federal minimum wage as a feature to be exploited in the estimation
strategy for the 1993 minimum wage change.
For the recent minimum wage hikes after the Argentine crisis in 2001/02 Kostzer
(2006) analyses the changes of the minimum wage with descriptive analysis of household
survey data and ￿nds that the minimum wage seems to have a higher impact on informal
sector workers. He argues that further empirical analysis of the minimum wage impact
on the informal sector is needed. SEL Consultores (2006) also conduct a descriptive
analysis and come to the same conclusion.
None of these studies on the Argentine minimum wage though have employed the
tools, kernel density distributions and di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates, advocated in the
minimum wage literature for developed and developing countries to study minimum wage
changes and their impact on the formal and informal labor market. The only studies
by Maloney and Nunez (2003) and Kristensen and Cunningham (2006) that examine
the minimum wage in Argentina, among other countries in Latin America, employed
Kernel density wage distribution and found evidence in this analysis of the minimum
wage impact on the informal segment of the labor market. The focus of these studies
tough was not on minimum wage changes, and the kernel density wage distributions
were only studied for one time point, 1998 or 2000 respectively.
Contrary to the previous literature my paper exploits the institutional features of
the federal minimum wage changes using empirical tools, kernel density distribution and
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation, from the U.S. and U.K. minimum wage literature to
substantiate the claim of an impact and even a higher impact of the minimum wage on
the informal sector￿ s wage distribution.
63 Background and data3
In this section I discuss the background, history and developments over the period 1992-
2005 of minimum wages in Argentina, where the two quasi-experiments of minimum wage
changes occurred. In addition to that informality in the labor market, the de￿nition and
development over this period, are also highlighted. Thereafter the household survey data
analyzed in this paper are described.
3.1 Background on minimum wages and informality
3.1.1 Minimum wage history and developments in Argentina
In 1950 Argentina rati￿ed the ILO convention on the minimum wage, which was rather
unspeci￿c in terms of the minimum wage level, frequency and regulation of minimum
wage changes (Bienen, 2002). In 1964 the minimum wage was introduced o¢ cially in
the Argentine labor law. By de￿nition, the Argentine minimum wage intended to enable
every employee, that works 200 hours per month, to be able to a⁄ord su¢ cient food,
accommodation, education, clothing, health care and transport. According to this law,
no worker should be paid less than the minimum wage. A national tripartite body of
representatives of the state, employers and employees, a national council, was established
to determine the minimum wage level and adjustments. However, some changes in the
law took place in 1978 and 1991, which granted more authority to the government, the
Ministry of Labor, in the minimum wage setting of this national council. The minimum
wage is set at federal level and no province-level minimum wages exist.
Developments of the minimum wage changes and increases are displayed in Table
1. The two minimum wage changes of interest in this paper were the minimum wage
change in July 1993 and September 2004.
In July 1993, after the hyperin￿ ation period in Argentina with several minimum
wage changes to adjust for the erosion due to persistent in￿ ation, the ￿rst o¢ cial real
minimum wage change of the 1990s increased the minimum wage from 97 pesos to 200
pesos in nominal terms per month in July 1993. For the period 1992 to 2005 these real
and nominal minimum wage developments in Figure 1 show that after the July 1993
increases in both real and nominal terms, a period of stable real and nominal wages
3Figures and Tables in Appendix 1.
7followed, with hardly any divergence between these two measures. The nominal level
of 200 pesos was maintained until after the crisis in 2001. In 2001 during the onset of
the Argentine economic crisis a huge deterioration in the minimum wage in real terms
occurred, bringing the real minimum wage to a level before the 1993 change.
Only in July 2003, about 10 years after the last minimum wage increase, the labor
minister authorized an increase in the minimum wage for the ￿rst time in a decade.
The minimum wage was augmented from 200 pesos to 250 pesos per month and thereby
started a minimum wage hike in the following months, where the July level of 250 pesos
was increased by gradual 10 pesos until 300 pesos in December 2003. In January 2004
the minimum wage was ￿xed at 350 pesos (MTSS 2004). These minimum wage changes
after the economic crisis of 2001/02 were implemented by the Argentine government
without the national council. The government argued that the minimum wage increases
were necessary to counter the price increases after the economic crisis and for this reason
were only re-instating the minimum wages e⁄ectiveness to pre-crisis level (ME 2005).
As Figure 1 shows the minimum wage increases beginning in 2003 brought the minimum
wage back to higher levels in real terms.
In August 2004 the national council met and decided a further now o¢ cial minimum
wage increase to 450 pesos for September 2004. Figure 2 examines the recent minimum
wage changes through an analysis of the actual purchasing power of a basic basket of
goods for Buenos Aires during the period 2000 to 2005, assuming the minimum wage
is paid for 200 hours worked in a month (ME 2005).4 After the large deterioration of
the minimum wage from the crisis and its subsequent recovery due the minimum wage
increases after July 2003, the increase to 450 pesos was the ￿rst minimum wage increase
to raise the minimum wage further than the actual pre-crisis levels. The hours worked
to obtain a basket of basic good decreased for the ￿rst time since October 2000.
Both Figure 1 and Figure 2 showed that the two minimum wage changes, which I
analyze, in July 1993 and September 2004 were in fact real minimum wage changes and
therefore one would expect these changes to have an impact on the labor market.
4This basic basket di⁄ers from the o¢ cial basket as it includes even fewer goods (ME 2005). It
includes the basic goods and prices for the following items per month for which I collected the price
data and estimated the hours of work needed to obtain this basket: Beef 6kg, Milk 7.5l, dry noodles 4.5
kg, rice 3 kg, ￿ our 1.5 kg, potato 6kg, tomoatoes 9kg, bread 6kg, co⁄ee 600g, banana 9kg, sugar 3kg,
oil 900ml and butter 750kg.
83.1.2 Informality in the labor market
To estimate the impact of minimum wage changes on the formal and informal labor mar-
ket, the de￿nition of informality in the labor market and the development of informality
over the time period of the two minimum wage changes are important.
In this paper the de￿nition of informality is as follows: A worker is an informal
worker if he/she does not have access or rights to a pension. This is coded from the
Argentine individual household survey questionnaire. Other de￿nitions of labor infor-
mality, such as the ILO classi￿cation of low-productivity, unskilled, marginal jobs as
informal work, exist for Argentina (Gasparini 2003: World Bank 2006). Here, the legal-
istic de￿nition, which is more closely linked to the ideas of De Soto (1989) about the
nature of the informal sector, was employed to analyze the coverage of two labor laws
and regulations, the minimum wage and social security contributions, and the impact
of changes in the minimum wage. Workers without social security coverage might still
earn the minimum wage and changes in the minimum wage might increase the wages in
the informal sector.
This is also pointed out by Marshall (2004, p.10):
Non-compliance needs not be uniform, for instance, evasion of social se-
curity contributions can go hand in hand with compliance with the minimum
wage [...], and in depth studies, are needed to establish which legal constraints
tend to be applied, and which tend to be evaded.
In Figure 3 the development of the share of informal workers over the period 1990
to 2005 increased. A rapid increase in informality occurred after the 2001/02 crisis. For
the period around the two minimum wage changes, 1993 and 2004, the informality share
in the labor market remained relatively stable.
3.2 Data
For the estimations in this paper I mainly worked with the Argentine national household
surveys, the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) for the year 1993 and the Continuous
Permanent Household survey (EPH-C) for the year 2004. For 1993 the May and October
waves around the July minimum wage change and for the 2004 the second trimester and
fourth trimester waves around the September minimum wage change were worked with in
9the estimations. In terms of data and the possible estimations this gives rather a short-
term e⁄ect. However, longer-term e⁄ects through the use of 1994 or 1992 data would
be very hard to account for in an economy like Argentina. In addition to that, the data
available for those years di⁄ered slightly from the May and October 1993 waves. For this
reason taking the immediate household survey proceeding and following the minimum
wage policy change seemed most appropriate. Seasonal variation between the May and
October rounds of the survey does not dramatically a⁄ect most statistics as the surveys
cover only urban areas (CEDLAS, 2004, citing INDEC (2001)).5
These household surveys cover about 31 urban areas in the country and thereby cover
about 60 percent of the Argentine population. The urban coverage was extended over
the years. The surveys in the early 1990s, also the one in 1993, do not cover all the areas
consistently. Still, this includes the major urban areas of Argentina. In the estimation
only urban areas, which are in the May and October wave for 1993 are included. So, in
fact the repeated cross-section of urban areas was employed in the estimations. In the
trimester data for 2004 the codes for a restricted set of urban areas were provided by
the National Statistical O¢ ce (INDEC).
The individual and household questionnaires covered questions relating to demo-
graphics, education, income, social security contribution and the labor market. The
household survey is a rotating panel of urban households. The panel structure iden-
ti￿cation, although the individuals are repeated in the survey, is di¢ cult in the early
1990s due to the lack of codes provided by INDEC. In the new EPH-C also some of the
explicit codes for the identi￿cation of the panel were not provided as well.
The minimum wage data were collected from the Argentine Ministry of Labor and
the Ministry of Economy (MTSS 2004; ME 2005). GDP per province was obtained from
Province of Buenos Aires Ministry of Economy and CPI and price data were collected
from INDEC.
5Adjustment for seasonality does not seem to be necessary in this case. Moreover, the data limita-
tions, in terms of comparability of regions between 1992 and 1993, would make this di¢ cult.
104 Empirical tests of the impact of minimum wage
changes on the informal sector
This section describes the empirical tests and results for the impact of the Argentine
minimum wage changes on the formal and informal labor market. In the ￿rst subsection
I discuss the empirical strategy for the 1993 minimum wage change and in the second
subsection the results are presented. In the third subsection a simple robustness check,
using the 2004 minimum wage change, is described.
4.1 Empirical strategy for the 1993 minimum wage change
In the U.S. and U.K. empirical literature on the minimum wage it has now become quite
standard to exploit the occurrence of a minimum wage change, a quasi-experiment, as a
source of exogenous variation (Card and Krueger 1995; Card 1992ab). To estimate the
causal e⁄ect of minimum wages a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator before and after the
minimum wage change is usually estimated for outcome variables for two groups, the
treatment and control group. The main issue is the de￿nition of treatment and control
group as the control group provides valuable information in the absence of treatment,
the counterfactual. For instance, comparable individuals at higher levels of the wage
distribution can constitute the control group for the minimum wage earners (Currie and
Fallick 1996; Pischke and Acemoglu 2003). However, for this to be a valid control group
it would require that we assume that there is no e⁄ect of minimum wage changes on
multiples of the minimum wage. Another commonly used control and treatment group
follows the well-known fast-food restaurant experiments in an a⁄ected state and not
a⁄ected state by a minimum wage change (Card and Krueger 1995). Given that the
Argentine minimum wage might have a potential ripple e⁄ect at higher levels of the
wage distribution and is also a national minimum wage, these two methods are not
applicable to form control and treatment group.
Still, it is possible to design a control and treatment group for a national minimum
wage change while exploiting regional variation. As Card (1992a) pointed out that ￿ the
national minimum wage is an under-appreciated asset from the evaluation point of view￿ .
The federal minimum wage in combination with a high regional wage variation could be
used in the assessment of the impact of a minimum wage change (Card 1992a; Card and
11Krueger 1995 chapter 4; Stewart 2002).
The regional wage variation implies that the minimum wage change would a⁄ect
an initial proportion of ￿ low-paid￿workers below the new minimum wage in each state,
varying across the di⁄erent states. The minimum wage bites to di⁄ering degrees in an
area￿ s wage distribution. The treatment and control group are de￿ned according to
the potential di⁄erential impact or bite of the new minimum wage in the urban areas.
The assignment of area a into control group, the low impact group, and into treatment
group, the high impact group, is determined by this initial proportion of below the new
minimum wage earners in the area. The di⁄erential impact of the minimum wage is the
source of exogenous variation in this estimation strategy.
The mean treatment on the treated e⁄ect, which is the impact on the high impact
group, is estimated as the following di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator
^ ￿DID =
￿￿ Yat ￿ ￿ Yat￿1
￿
HI ￿
￿￿ Yat ￿ ￿ Yat￿1
￿
LI (1)
where the ￿rst bracket represent the two-period di⁄erence of the mean outcome
variable ￿ Y for the high impact group HI at time t, after the minimum wage change,
and at time t￿1, before the minimum wage change. Analogously, the second bracket is
the two-period di⁄erence of the mean outcome variable ￿ Y for the low impact group LI.
Here, the outcome variable ￿ Y is wages, total, formal or informal sector. This estimator
is obtained from the following regression
Yat = ￿0 + ￿1Mt + ￿2Da + ￿MtDa + "at (2)
where Mt is a time dummy that takes the value 1 for October 1993 and 0 for May
1993. The treatment dummy Da takes the value 1 if area a is in the high impact group
and 0 if area a is in the low impact group. The interaction term MtDa is a dummy
variable for the observation being in the high impact group after the minimum wage
increase. Hence, ￿ is the true causal e⁄ect of the treatment on the outcome for this
group, which in turn is the estimator of interest ^ ￿DID here.
The key identifying assumption for the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator here is that
￿ would be 0 in the absence of ￿ treatment￿ . Basically, the underlying trend in outcome
variable, wages, across the urban areas, control and treatment group, is assumed to be
12the same in the absence of the minimum wage. Clearly, this can be a potential problem
to this type of estimation, a treat to validity (Meyer 1995).
Other factors could in￿ uence the results and this in turn would make the identi￿ca-
tion of an e⁄ect of a minimum wage change on ￿ Y doubtful. Here, the error term "at
can be decomposed into several e⁄ects, individual speci￿c and common macroeconomic
e⁄ects, which cancel out through di⁄erencing.6 For instance, if macroeconomic e⁄ects
were to systematically di⁄er between high and low impact groups then the di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence estimator here would be biased. The inclusion of a vector of characteristics
X￿
at as controls in the estimation of (2) can adjust for observable di⁄erence between the
observations of the two groups.
Thus the regression equation would be
Yat = ￿0 + ￿1Mt + ￿2Da + ￿MtDa + X
￿
at￿ + "at (3)
In my estimations I adjusted for potential group level di⁄erences, which might lead
the minimum wage policy to systematically di⁄er among the groups. In particular the
concern was that the minimum wage policy might interact di⁄erently with the local
labor market or economy across the high impact and low impact groups over time.
The main identifying assumption of equal trends in the outcomes for the high impact
and low impact groups is crucial. For example, during this time period a shift in a
sectoral industry to an industry, which employs more formal workers, in one area might
change the impact of the minimum wage policy. Another possibility could be also a
local area recovery, which is unrelated to the minimum wage increase, but might have
an impact on wages (Meyer 1995; Angrist and Krueger 1999). To account for these
potential problems controls for the industry sector, the regional gross domestic product
and individual level controls, like age, gender and education were introduced during the
estimations.
6Individual-level standard errors need to allow for possible correlation between the error terms within
a local urban area and need to be adjusted for by clustering. The coe¢ cient and sign remain the same
but the standard error would be di⁄erent when clustered by urban area.
134.2 Results7
This section presents the results for the Argentine minimum wage change in 1993. First,
two tests for the applicability of the proposed estimation strategy are o⁄ered. The ￿rst
test examines whether the minimum wage does have an e⁄ect on the wage distribution
of the formal and informal labor market or not. The second test inspects whether there
is a degree of geographical variation in the area wage distributions or not. After these
two tests, I discuss the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation results.
4.2.1 Test for minimum wage e⁄ect on wage distribution
Before estimating the impact of the minimum wage on the formal and informal sector
with the proposed empirical strategy, a test of whether the minimum wage has an impact
on the wage distribution, is in fact binding, was performed. Kernel wage densities for
the formal and informal wage distribution show that the informal wage distribution lies
to the left of the formal wage distribution (Figure 4). This result is consistent with the
￿ndings by Maloney and Nunez (2003) for a di⁄erent time period. The lower tails of
the Kernel wage densities show that the informal wage distribution has spikes around
the old and new minimum wage levels, 97 and 200 pesos respectively, while the formal
wage distribution does not (Figure 5). From the cumulative wage distribution one can
observe that the lower end of the informal cumulative distribution lies above the formal
distribution (Figure 6). A higher percent of informal workers is allocated at the lower
end of the wage distribution than formal workers at those wage levels. Cli⁄s or steps in
the distribution indicate whether the minimum wage is binding at these wage level. A
clustering of workers at these wage levels point to the minimum wage being binding at
those levels (Kristensen and Cunningham 2006). In the informal cumulative distribution
the steps are slightly more pronounced than for the formal distribution.
4.2.2 Test for geographical variation
For the speci￿c estimator ^ ￿DID based on comparing high impact and low impact groups
of urban areas in Argentina to give believable results, certain conditions need to be
satis￿ed ￿rst:
7Figures and Tables in Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics and Variable Description in Appendix 2.
14(1)Wage distributions of the two groups, high impact and low impact, need to be
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other (Stewart 2002).
(2) A signi￿cant relationship with the fraction of workers in an area initially below
the new minimum wage and the wage movements is necessary (Stewart 2002).
The main interest here it to test the variation of the minimum wage￿ s bite in the
di⁄erent urban areas wage distributions as this determines the distinction between treat-
ment and control group, high impact and low impact.8
An initial look at the Kernel density wage distributions by urban areas for total labor
income provides an insight into the di⁄erent area wage distributions (Figure 7). The
variation of the bite, the proportion of workers below the new minimum wage of 200
pesos (depicted by the second vertical line) varies, although at the lower end of the wage
distribution in each urban area, greatly between urban areas. In Figure 8 the percentage
below the new incoming minimum wage is plotted by area. Clearly, there are several
urban areas, which exhibit a higher share of people below the new minimum wage.9
These form the high impact group while the remaining are classi￿ed as the low impact
group. The Kernel wage densities for the high impact and low impact groups have very
di⁄erent wage distributions as the distribution of the high impact group is located to
the left of the distribution for the low impact group (Figure 9). This result is very
similar to Stewart (2002) who uses this econometric methodology for the U.K. minimum
wage introduction. Also following Stewart (2002), the two-period change for di⁄erent
aspects of an area￿ s wage distribution is illustrated in Figure 10. Moving from areas with
a low proportion of employees paid below the new minimum wage to areas with high
percentage of below the minimum wage, the ￿rst percentile of the wage distribution
increases rapidly. Contrary to this the median and mean of the distribution change
relatively little and certainly do not increase (Stewart 2002). This yet again is further
evidence for geographical variation of the di⁄erent urban areas at the lower end of the
wage distribution, where the minimum wage change bites.
8To include the entire variation in the bite instead of a dichotomous classi￿cation of high impact and
low impact could be an alternative estimation strategy. In this paper I have followed the estimation
strategy of Stewart (2002) of high impact and low impact groups.
9The local areas of Jujuy, Salta, Tucuman, Catamarca and Parana have the highest percentage.
These areas form the high impact group and the remaining areas the low impact group.
154.2.3 Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation results
The tests for binding of the minimum wage and geographical variation, validate the
use of the empirical strategy outlined earlier and the estimations performed follow the
template of Stewart (2002) and Card (1992a). For the estimations of the wage outcomes,
area-level (unweighted) and individual-level (weighted) estimates, where the standard
error was adjusted for clustering were calculated without and with controls (Table 2 to
Table 4). From the area-level estimations, small positive, not signi￿cant coe¢ cients for
the informal wage are obtained. The wage impacts for former workers had large positive
coe¢ cients, but they were not signi￿cant either. The overall wage had a coe¢ cient that
was negative and not signi￿cant. As none of the coe¢ cients were signi￿cant tough, the
conclusion from this mean area-level estimations seems that there was no wage impact
of the minimum wage change (Table 2). Contrary to this, the individual estimations
without controls produced a positive signi￿cant impact for the informal wage and overall
wage. For the formal sector wage it was also positive and not signi￿cant (Table 3). Here,
the wage impact of the minimum wage change has an impact on the informal sector wage
and wages in general. With the inclusion of a combination of di⁄erent controls, local area
and individual controls, the magnitude of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates increased
for all the wage segments and measures (Table 4).10
Overall, it is possible to say that there seems to be a signi￿cant positive impact on
the informal sector wage and the overall wage distribution. The formal sector wage does
not exhibit these properties and remains not signi￿cant.
Throughout the estimations data limitations in terms of urban coverage, as men-
tioned might still result in potentially biased results and a robustness check with another
minimum wage change seems appropriate.
4.3 A robustness check - the 2004 minimum wage change
To check whether the results for the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator for 1993 are in fact
robust, I perform a robustness check with another minimum wage change in 2004. Given
data limitations due to changes in the household survey, it was not possible to apply
the same di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator. Bearing also in mind that the minimum
10Gender, age and education were the individual sector controls. GDP per province and and industry
sectors were the local area controls.
16wage change in September 2004 occurred after a period of increases in informality in the
labor market, related and unrelated to the Argentine economic crisis in 2001/02, Kernel
density distribution for the informal wage before the minimum wage change showed a
clear spike at the old minimum wage of 350 pesos, which was the current minimum
wage in the second trimester 2004 (Figure 11). The formal sector wage distribution does
not display any spike at all while the informal wage distribution does. The cumulative
distribution also exhibits a concentration and small cli⁄ in the informal sector wage
and even small one for the formal wage (Figure 12). For the fourth trimester 2004,
after the minimum wage increase to 450 pesos, the Kernel density for both, formal and
informal sector exhibit a spike and even a plateau around the minimum wage while the
cumulative distribution again shows a small jump at the minimum wage (Figure 13 and
Figure 14). Hence, the minimum wage has a continued impact on the wage distribution
of the informal sector and its change e⁄ects the informal wage.
5 Conclusion
The impact of labor laws and regulations on the informal labor market has been the focus
of the literature on developing country labor markets. This paper tested empirically
the hypothesis often mentioned that the minimum wage does have an impact on the
informal labor market, possibly even a stronger impact on the informal than formal
labor market. Exploiting quasi-experiments of minimum wage changes and applying
econometric techniques, kernel density graphs and di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation,
employed by the minimum wage literature in the U.S. and the U.K. (Card 1992ab; Card
and Krueger 1995; Stewart 2002), I found empirical support that the minimum wage and
minimum wage changes have an impact on informal wages and even a higher impact on
informal sector wages than formal sector wages. The di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimations
for the 1993 minimum wage change showed a signi￿cant positive impact on informal
sector wage distribution and on overall wages. These results were robust when looking
at the kernel densities of a 2004 minimum wage change. Data limitations with respect
to the geographical coverage did not allow an extension of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
estimator to the 2004 case, which only allows visual inspections of the kernel densities.
This makes the ￿ndings for 2004 less convincing than the 1993 minimum wage analysis
based on kernel densities and di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates.
17Following up the quote in the introduction with empirical evidence, the Argentine
minimum wage is more e⁄ective among those who are regarded informal sector workers
than in other segments of the labor market.11 A lighthouse e⁄ect, a term employed if
the minimum wage a⁄ects the wage determination in the informal sector, is found to be
the case for Argentina.
These results are not only interesting for the Argentine case, but also contribute to
the broader debate on the view of the labor market. In the traditional view of the dual
labor market by Harris and Todaro (1970) the informal sector would have experienced a
wage decrease due to minimum wage increases in the formal sector. After the minimum
wage increase in the formal sector, some unemployed workers of the formal sector would
seek employment in the informal sector, thereby driving informal sector wages down.
Yet, the results in this paper do not support this view of the labor market as an increase
of informal sector wages, even stronger than formal sector wages, was estimated. The
overall e⁄ect of the minimum wage was dominated by the informal sector. The dualistic
model of the segmented labor markets does not seem to apply universally to developing
country labor markets. The idea put forward that the minimum wage might serve
as a reference wage and non-compliance with labor legislation is not practised on all
levels seems to apply (Marshall 2004). Employers might pay the minimum wage but not
comply with the social security registration (Marshall 2004; Kostzer 2006; Kristensen and
Cunningham 2006). The other theoretical explanations for the minimum wage impact
on the informal sector wage, which might involve second round impacts of the minimum
wage change, might play a role. However, due to the short-term e⁄ects of minimum
wages changes on the informal sector, investigated in this paper, these explanations
might be secondary.
These ￿ndings raise the question which sets of policies, not necessarily labor market
policies, are appropriate to address compliance with minimum wages and social security
contribution. To investigate this future research on what barriers and incentives exist
on the employer level to comply with the minimum wage and not the social security
system would provide further insight into the appropriate design of policies to address
this dimension of formality-informality interaction in the labor market.
11It could even be argued from the visual inspection of the formal wage distribution that the minimum
wage does not bite very much for formal sector workers. This could be a further explanation for the
observed results.
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23Annex 1: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Minimum Wage Changes, 1980 -2005 



















 1989 average 11717
 1990 20000
 1990 September 720000
1990 average 253333
1991 720000
























Note: 1) Monthly urban minimum wages
2) Effective after 1.3.1992 1 Peso=10,000 Australes,
Argentine Peso thereafter. 
3) Minimum wage increases of interest in bold. 
Sources: ILO LABMINW, Ministery of Economy, 
MTSS Informe Enero 2004,  Anuario-93
Nominal Minimum Wages 
 





Informal sector wage  1.45 [ 0.13 ] 0.90
Formal sector wage  6.89  [ 0.10 ] 0.92
wage (formal and informal) -0.92  [-0.03]   0.98
With local area control:        3/
Informal sector wage  1.45   [0.15]  0.88
Formal sector wage  6.89 [ 0.11] 0.91
wage (formal and informal) -0.92 [-0.04 ] 0.97
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1/Labour income
2/  Robust t-ratios in parentheses. 
3/ Local area control: GDP by province
Source: own calculations based on EPH, INDEC.
mean-area-level estimate




Table 3: Individual-level Difference-in-Difference estimate: Wage Impact –No controls 
     
Difference-in-Difference 
Dependent variable: wage individual level estimate, θ
No controls θ t-test p-value
Informal sector wage 5.01 [1.90] 0.074 **
Formal sector wage  21.22  [1.19] 0.251
wage (formal and informal) 6.56  [1.78] 0.093 **
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1/ Labour income.
2/ Robust t-ratios in parentheses. 
3/ The t-ratios for the individual level equations are based on standard errors
that allow for "clustering" by area.
Source: own estimations based on EPH, INDEC.












  25Table 4: Individual-level Difference-in-Difference estimate: Wage Impact –With 
Controls 
     
Difference-in-Difference 
Dependent variable: wage individual level estimate, θ
With controls θ t-test p-value
(1) industry sector controls
Informal sector wage 38.51  [4.85] 0.00 ***
Formal sector wage  20.88 [1.13] 0.273
wage (formal and informal) 39.43  [3.01] 0.008 ***
(2) industry sector and individual controls                   3/
Informal sector wage 33.91 [4.38] 0.00 ***
Formal sector wage  14.31 [0.83] 0.418
wage (formal and informal) 31.76 [3.52] 0.003 ***
(3) local area controls                                             4/
Informal sector wage 36.86 [4.54] 0.00 ***
Formal sector wage  20.15  [1.10] 0.289
wage (formal and informal) 38.55 [2.99] 0.008 ***
Note:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1/ Robust t-ratios in parentheses. 
2/ The t-ratios for the individual level equations are based on standard errors
that allow for "clustering" by area.
3/ Individual level controls: gender, age and education.
4/ Local area controls: GDP by province and industry sector.
Source: own estimations based on EPH, INDEC.







  26Figure 1: Nominal and real national minimum wage, 1992-2005 






















real minimum wage (1999=100)
Sources: ILO LABMINW database, Argentine Ministry of Economy, MTSS, Anuario-93.  
 
Figure 2: Minimum wage and basic consumption, 2000-2005 
 

















change to ARG$ 450
 








  27Figure 3: Informality in the labor market developments, 1990-2005 
















































































Note: M: May. O: October. I: 1st semester. II: 2nd semester. 




Figure 4: Kernel density (total) - labor income (formal and informal) 
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Source: own estimations based on EPH. 
 
  28Figure 5: Kernel density (lower end) - labor income (formal and informal 
































Kernel densities (lower end) - May 1993
 
Source: own estimations based on EPH. 
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Source: own estimations based on EPH. 
  29Figure 7: Kernel density (total) – labor income by urban area 
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Source: own estimations based on EPH. 
 
Figure 8:  Scatter plot of percentage below minimum wage, by urban area 
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  30Figure 9:  Kernel density – High and Low impact areas 
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Source: own estimations based on EPH. 
 
Figure 10:  Change in area wage distributions, total 
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  31Figure 11: Kernel density – wage (formal and informal) 
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Source: own calculations based on EPH-C. 
 
Figure 12: Cumulative distribution – wage (formal and informal) 
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Source: own calculations based on EPH-C. 
  32Figure 13: Kernel density – wage (formal and informal) 
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Source: own calculations based on EPH-C. 
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  33 
Annex 2: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Description 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of wage earners at or below the minimum wage, 1993 






below 15 12.58 5.29
16 to 25 27.18 28.58
 26 to 40 22.73 25.61
41 to 64 28.59 32.86





primary incomplete 22.14 20.27
primary complete 30.80 36.21
secondary incomplete 21.53 20.94
secondary complete 5.20 10.79
teritary incomplete 8.68 5.64


















Sample Size 490 3264
Population 125,972 645,909
Note:
1/ All numbers are in percent for employees and self-employed and frequency unless stated otherwise.
2/ Minimum wage is 97 Peso for May and 200 Peso for October.
3/ Wealth deciles, total family income.
Source: own calculations based on the EPH, INDEC.
Characteristics of wage earners at or below minimum wage, weighted, May and October 1993





  34Table 6: High impact and low impact group characteristics 
"High impact" group  2/ "Low impact" group  3/
Sample size (based on total below minimum wage) 1093 1219
Mean monthly wage    4/ 415.46 643.49
Median monthly wage 300 500
1st percentile wage 50 60
5th percentile wage 100 150
10th percentile wage 145 200
Proportion of "low paid"/ bite   5/ 16.68 6.11
Note:
1/ Divided by proportion of initially earning below the new minimum wage.
2/ High impact group includes: Parana, Jujuy, Catamarca, Salta and Tucuman.
3/ Low impact group includes the rest of the urban areas.
4/ In ARG$ Peso.
5/ Averages.
Source: own calculations based on the EPH, INDEC.





Table 7: Variable description 
 
wage
local area controls GDP per capita by province
industry sector industry dummy
individual controls gender dummy, education level dummy, age
Variable Descriptions for DID estimations























  35Table 8: Characteristics of wage earners at or below the minimum wage, 2004 
   








below 14 0.78 0.49
15 to 25 26.02 27.04
26 to 35 22.76 24.76
36 to 45 18.05 17.74
46 to 55 16.77 15.41
56 to 65 10.64 10.57





primary incomplete 13.33 11.05
primary complete 30.66 31.13
secondary incomplete 20.90 20.93
secondary complete 17.46 18.44
teritary incomplete 11.48 11.64









Public Services 3.89 5.61
Financial Services 4.90 5.42
Public Administration 3.04 3.39
Education, health, other services 36.47 33.56
Firm size
1 to 5 employees 77.63 71.88
6 to 40 employees 14.61 18.34
more than 40 employees 7.76 9.78
Sample Size 5209 6506
Population 2,300,692 3,043,110
Note:
1/Minimum wage is 350 Peso for 2nd trimester 2004 and 450 Peso for 4th trimester 2004.
Source: on calculations based on the EPH-C. 
Characteristics of wage earners at or below minimum wage, weighted, 2nd and 4th trimester 2004
2nd trimester 2004 4th trimester 2004
 
 
  36